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JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§§ 78-2-2(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD REVIEW
I.

ISSUES

1.

Whether the trial court erred in concluding that in a contractual action brought

against a professional accounting firm the action is treated in all respects as a tort action.
(Issue preserved R. at 373-80.)
2.

Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded that an action for breach of an

implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is necessarily based on a breach of a tort
duty. (Issue preserved R. at 375-77.)
3.

Whether the trial court incorrectly concluded that the tort doctrine that an

employer is not liable in respondeat superior for the illegal act of an employee is an absolute
defense to a breach of contract action against the employer. (Issue preserved R. at 379-80.)
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment should not be granted unless, after making all reasonable
inferences in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the party bringing the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Willard Pease Oil v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co,, 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995).
Appellate courts "review [a] trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, giving
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no particular deference to its conclusions of law." Id. The court "determine^] only whether
the trial court erred in applying the governing law and whether the trial court correctly held
that there were no disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah
1989) (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 749 (Utah 1983)).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF T H E CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

This case is a claim brought by Guardian Title Company of Utah (Guardian), against
Stacey Mitchell, formerly known as Stacey Howell (Mitchell), alleging conversion, and
against her employers, Tebbs & Smith (Tebbs), Douglas Rex (Rex), and Stagg & Associates
(Stagg) alleging breaches of contract. On September 15, 2000, Stagg filed a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment or, in the Alternative, Motion in Limine asserting that it was
entitled to summary judgment because (1) Stagg did not breach an agreement with Guardian,
(2) Guardian's claim is a tort claim, which is barred by Guardian's own negligence, and (3)
Guardian's claim is a tort claim, which is barred by agency principles. On September 19,
2000, Rex joined Stagg's motion, and on September 29,2000, Tebbs joined Stagg's motion.
Both joinders were filed after the court-ordered dispositive motion deadline, and, thus,
Guardian objected to them.

U8398.GU006.010
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After oral argument held on October 25, 2000, the trial court granted, inter alia,
summary judgment for Stagg, Tebbs, and Rex based upon "the reasons advanced by Stagg,"
and denied Guardian's motion to strike Tebbs' and Mr. Rex's joinders. An order was then
entered by Judge Anne M. Stirba on November 15,2000, granting partial summary judgment
to Stagg, Tebbs, and Rex. (A copy of the Order is attached as Exhibit A to the Addendum.)
Pursuant to agreement between Guardian, Ms. Mitchell, and Stagg, a stipulated judgment
against Ms. Mitchell and in favor of Guardian was entered on March 15, 2001. (A copy of
the stipulated judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit B to the Addendum.) Guardian and
Stagg have settled all outstanding claims between them and an order of dismissal of
Guardian's claims against Stagg was also entered by the Court on March 15, 2001. (A copy
of the Order of Dismissal is attached hereto as Exhibit C to the Addendum.) The Notice of
Appeal was filed on March 22, 2001.
This appeal is from the order entered by Judge Anne M. Stirba on November 15,
2000, granting summary judgment to Tebbs and Rex.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

In the mid-1970s, Guardian entered into an agreement with Tebbs in which Tebbs
agreed to provide professional accounting services for Guardian. (R. at 182, 210.) From
approximately 1983, those services included the preparation of checks made payable to
Guardian's employees and drawn on Guardian's bank checking account (Payroll Account),
the performance of account statement reconciliation services with regard to the Payroll
118398.GU006.010
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Account, the preparation of payroll tax reports, and the making of bank deposits of
withholding, payroll, social security, and other taxes. (R. at 3, 37-38, 182-83, 210.)
Guardian paid Tebbs monthly for Tebbs' services. (R. at 182.) Rex was Guardian's contact
at Tebbs from approximately 1983 or 1984 until October 1997. (Id.) During that time,
employees under Mr. Rex's supervision were given the responsibility to calculate the amount
to be paid each Guardian employee and to prepare the Guardian payroll checks. (R. at 211.)
In 1995, Mitchell, a Tebbs' employee, was given the responsibility to handle Guardian's
payroll. (R. at 183.) At that time Stacey Mitchell used the name Stacey Howell, which was
her married name from December 1985 to August 1988. (Id.)
In about 1996, Guardian began providing blank payroll checks to Tebbs that were presigned by Douglas Curlis, Guardian's president and owner, and which Tebbs then prepared
for delivery to Guardian's employees. (Id.) Under this arrangement, Tebbs, who kept the
blank checks at its offices, delivered blank checks to Guardian, which Mr. Curlis, who lived
in St. George, would sign, and then return to Tebbs. (R. at 184.) Tebbs would then fill in the
appropriate names and amounts on the checks and return the checks to Guardian to distribute
to Guardian employees, pursuant to a list Guardian had prepared which included the
employees to be paid and the amount to be paid to them. (R. at 212.) At a later date,
Guardian also implemented a signature stamp procedure for the payroll checks. (R. at 18485.) Under this arrangement, if Mr. Curlis was in Salt Lake City to sign the payroll checks,
he would do so. (R. at 185.) However, if he was not in Salt Lake, Guardian would pick up
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the checks from Tebbs, and one of Guardian's employees would pre-stamp the blank payroll
checks and return them to Tebbs to there be completed. (Id.)
In 1997, Rex left Tebbs and began to work on his own. (R. at 189.) Mitchell soon
thereafter left Tebbs and began working for Mr. Rex. (R. at 190.) In October 1997,
Guardian shifted its accounting services from Tebbs to Mr. Rex. (Id.) Mr. Rex assumed all
Guardian's accounting services, including payroll, taxes, and the other services Tebbs had
provided. (Id.) No procedures changed for the handling of the Payroll Account. (Id.)
On December 15, 1997, Ms. Mitchell went to work for Stagg & Associates (Stagg).
(R. at 191.) At the same time, Guardian changed its accounting services from Rex to Stagg.
(Id.) Soon thereafter Guardian discovered that during the time that Mitchell handled the
Payroll Account, she prepared and drew forty-seven checks on that account made payable
to "Stacey Howell:" the first of which was dated September 20,1996, the last dated in March
1998. (R. at 192-93, 216-17.) Each of the checks were endorsed with the name "Stacey
Howell" and deposited to her bank account. (R. at 193.) During the time that Mitchell was
employee at Tebbs there were thirty-five of these checks written and drawn on the Payroll
Account. (R. at 245-91, 464, 6.) During her employment with Mr. Rex, there were three
checks drawn on the Payroll Account. (R. at 245-91,464, 6.) During her employment with
Stagg, there were nine checks drawn on the Payroll Account. (R. at 193.)
On April 14, 1999, Guardian filed the complaint in this action against Ms. Mitchell
alleging conversion, and against Tebbs, Rex, and Stagg alleging breaches of contract.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment to Rex and Tebbs by coming
to several incorrect conclusions. The trial court misinterpreted Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein &
Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996),
when the court held that Kilpatrick required that it engage in a negligence analysis, even foi
breach of contract claims, in determining questions of law before it. Kilpatrick very clearly
recognizes that three separate causes of action arise in professional malpractice settings: (1)
breach of contract, (2) breach of fiduciary duty, and (3) negligence. In fact, Kilpatrick
specifically recognized that breach of contract causes of action are conceptually distinct from
breaches of fiduciary duty and negligence causes of action. Kilpatrick*s recognition of these
separate and distinct causes of action is consistent with the law of this and other jurisdictions.
The trial court, therefore, incorrectly applied a negligence analysis to Guardian's contract
claims.
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing was a tort duty and that Guardian's assertion of the covenant would give rise to new
and independent rights not contemplated by the agreements between the parties. Of course,
this Court has already concluded that an action for breach of the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing is an action sounding in contract. Further, because the contracts at issue
expressly limited Tebbs' and Rex's authority to prepare checks for Guardian employees and
expressly required Tebbs and Rex to reconcile the payroll accounts, Guardian's assertion of
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the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in this case is not an assertion of new and
independent rights not agreed to between the parties to these contracts. Any preparation of
checks for anyone besides Guardian employees or not specifically authorized by Guardian
violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Tebbs' and Rex's failure to reconcile
the accounts and failure to notify Guardian of the unauthorized checks it would have found
had Tebbs and Rex reconciled the accounts also violated the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.
Finally, the trial court incorrectly concluded that because the breach of the contract
was caused by the illegal act of Tebbs' and Rex's employee, the claim was barred by the
principle that an employer is not liable for the illegal acts of an employee done for the
employee's sole benefit. The application of this doctrine applies only to negligence actions
which seek to impose vicarious liability on an employer for the employee's negligence. This
claim is a breach of contract which seeks only to recover for Tebbs' and Rex's breaches of
their respective contracts. Thus, the doctrine does not apply in this context. If it did,
significant mischief would ensue, and innocent contracting parties, who have paid for
services, would neither be entitled to enforce their contract for services nor to seek
reimbursement of the consideration they gave for the contract.
ARGUMENT
In support of their motions for partial summary judgment below, Rex and Tebbs
argued that, (1) they did not breach an agreement with Guardian, (2) Guardian's claim is a
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tort claim, which is barred by Guardian's own negligence, and (3) Guardian's claim is a tort
claim, which is barred by agency principles. (See R. at 195,198,202.)1 After oral argument,
the trial court made the following ruling:
With regard to [the] motion for summary judgment or alternatively, the
motion in limine, certainly Kilpatrick stands for the proposition that implicit
in any professional agreement to perform services, such as accounting
services, is the duty to deal honestly with funds entrusted by a client and
although this is a . . . contractual action, the court in Kilpatrick made clear that
the analysis is the same with this duty as it would be in a negligence action.
And for example, causation or proximate cause, for that matter, must be
shown.
And as to the implied covenant of good faith, . . . it appears that this
does not help [Guardian], as the covenant cannot be construed to imply new
independent rights not agreed upon by the parties and I'm looking to the
Nordstrom case for support for that position.
And—but with regard to this agency issue, Guardian has not suggested
that Mitchell's acts were undertaken for any benefit but her own. Clearly, on
the undisputed facts before the Court at this point, that Mitchell's acts—and
they appear to have been conceded for this argument anyway—that she wrote
. . . these checks to herself, that she did these solely for her benefit and not for
the benefit of her employer.
The principle that an employer is not liable for the illegal acts of an
employee done for the employee's sole benefit, applies to contract actions as
well, unless otherwise agreed.
Accordingly, for these reasons and the other reasons argued, the motion
for partial summary judgment is granted.

1

Both Tebbs and Rex joined Stagg & Associates motion for summary judgment.
(See R. at 339, 395.)
118398.GU006.010
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(R. at 464,33-34. A copy of the relevant portions of the transcript of the summary judgment
hearing are attached as Exhibit D to the Addendum.) Guardian respectfully contends that
this ruling is severely flawed, and, consequently, the trial court incorrectly granted summary
judgment to Tebbs and Rex.
I.

T H E TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT IN A CONTRACTUAL ACTION
AGAINST A PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING FIRM THE ACTION IS TREATED IN ALL
RESPECTS AS A TORT ACTION

The first major flaw of the trial court's analysis was that it concluded that it was
required by Utah common law to apply tort principles to the contractual cause of action
brought by Guardian against Tebbs and Rex. This faulty premise derives from the trial
court's apparent misunderstanding of Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283
(Utah Ct. App. 1996), cert denied, 919 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1996). Kilpatrick was a case
involving a legal malpractice claim, in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant law firm
had committed legal malpractice by breaching its fiduciary duties to the plaintiff. See id. at
1289. Although the defendant conceded that there were issues of material fact regarding its
breach of fiduciary duties, it argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on the basis
ofthe plaintiffs failure to bring forward any evidence of causation. See id.
The Utah Court of Appeals began its analysis of the causation questions by
summarizing the general concepts underlying legal malpractice. It very clearly stated that
"[ljegal malpractice is a generic term for at least three distinct causes of action available to
clients who suffer damages because of their lawyer's misbehavior. Clients wronged by their

118398.GU006.010

9

lawyers may sue for damages based on breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, or
negligence." Id. After setting forth the reason underlying these causes of action, because the
issue before it involved distinguishing between a cause of action arising- out of breach of
fiduciary duty and a cause of action arising out of negligence, the Court began its discussion
of the conceptual and legal distinctions between a cause of action arising under breach of
fiduciary duty theories and those arising under negligence theories. See id. at 1290-92.
Interestingly, as it began its discussion, the Court made the following comment: "While legal
malpractice actions based on breach of contract are conceptually distinct, legal malpractice
actions based on negligence and breach of fiduciary duty are more difficult to differentiate."
Id. at 1290 (emphasis added).
After concluding that breach of a fiduciary duty can give rise to a professional
malpractice claim, the Court then proceeded to the question of "the standard of causation for
legal malpractice actions" in the breach of fiduciary duty context. Id. Establishing that for
the most part the law relating to causation questions had developed "in the context of actions
based on negligence," the Court then made the following observation: "Although breach of
fiduciary duty actions concern different wrongs from negligence actions, the same standard
of causation applies whether the alleged wrong is a negligent act, a fiduciary breach, or even
a contractual breach." Id. at 1291.
Despite Kilpatrick's unambiguous language, Tebbs and Rex argued that it supported
their position that Guardian could assert only a negligence cause of action in a claim against
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a professional accounting firm. The trial court, taking a slightly different view of the
argument, ruled that "the court in Kilpatrick made clear that the analysis is the same with [a
contractual] duty as it would be in a negligence action," (R. at 464, 33). Of course, this
overly-broad reading of Kilpatrick is incorrect. As described above, Kilpatrick expressly
stated that a cause of action for breach of contract was "conceptually distinct" from the
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action. Further, its statement regarding
"the same standard" being applicable to all causes of action applies only to the causation
analysis. Kilpatrick is clear: there are three theories underlying claims for professional
malpractice in Utah: breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence. See 909
P.2d at 1289. Each cause of action has different elements and gives rise to a different claim.
See id. at 1290 (stating "legal malpractice actions based on breach of contract are
conceptually distinct" and "[b]reach of fiduciary duty . . . provides a basis for legal
malpractice separate and apart from professional negligence").2

2

The Kilpatrick conclusion that a distinct cause of action for breach of contract exists
in professional malpractice cases is in accord with the understanding of other courts and
commentators. See Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 627 (Md. 1985); Hutchinson v.
Smith, All So.2d 926, 927 (Miss. 1982); Dan L. Goldwasser & M. Thomas Arnold,
Accountants' Liability § 3.1 (1996); Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal
Malpractice § 8.5 (1996); Roy R. Anderson & Walter W. Steele, Jr., Fiduciary Duty, Tort
and Contract: A Primer on the Legal Malpractice Puzzle, 47 SMU L. Rev. 235,235 (1994).
118398.GU006.010
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Given the trial court's apparent misunderstanding of controlling Utah law, the trial
court incorrectly concluded that Utah law requires the court to engage in a tort analysis in
any professional malpractice claim, even those alleged in contract.3
II.

T H E TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT AN ACTION F O R BREACH OF
AN IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IS NECESSARILY BASED
ON A BREACH OF A TORT DUTY

Although the trial court apparently concluded that Kilpatrick required it to apply a tort
analysis to the contractual cause of action, because the trial court's conclusions are not
precise, one could argue that the trial court actually concluded that what it called an
accounting firm's "duty to deal honestly with funds entrusted to it" is, in fact, a duty arising
3

Given the ambiguity of the trial court's decision, it could be argued that the trial
court did not ultimately grant summary judgment based on its conclusion that in a
professional malpractice case a tort analysis must be used rather than a contract analysis. In
other words, one could say that the trial court granted summary judgment in this case based
upon its conclusion that the tort doctrine which declares that an employer is not liable in
respondeat superior for the illegal acts of an employee is also an absolute defense to a breach
of contract action against an employer. If the Court were to accept this argument, it could
conceivably reverse the trial court's order by simply concluding that the above-described
doctrine does not apply to contract causes of action.
However, Guardian believes that this Court: should address the trial court's conclusion
that breach of contract causes of action against professionals must be analyzed using a tort
analysis. The trial court apparently believes that Kilpatrick requires the tort analysis.
Accordingly, if this Court does not address the issue, the trial court is likely to proceed
according to its belief that it must analyze this case using a tort's analysis. Of course, doing
so will have a huge impact on applicable defenses at trial in this matter. Not only would the
determination of this issue be critical to the defenses applicable on remand to the trial court,
but, as discussed at some length in Guardian's Docketing Statement, this issue should be
addressed to clarify the law on this point. Accordingly, if this Court were not to address the
issue now and the trial court later acted pursuant to its mistaken conclusions regarding the
law, Guardian would likely appeal yet again. Obviously, Guardian believes resolution of this
issue now is critical and would promote judicial economy.
118398.GU006.010
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as a matter of public policy outside the scope of the contract, and, therefore, an action for that
breach is an allegation of a breach of a standard of care rather than an allegation of a breach
of contract. This is the position that Tebbs and Rex argued in their motion for summary
judgment. (See R. at 198-200.) If the Court did, in fact, so conclude, this determination was
also incorrect.
Guardian specifically alleges in its Complaint that Tebbs and Rex
agreed to provide and perform . . . certain professional public accounting
services. Those services included the preparation of checks made payable to
[Guardian's] employees and drawn on [Guardian's] bank checking account
("Payroll Account"), the performance of account statement reconciliation
services with regard to the Payroll Account, the preparation of payroll tax
reports and the making of bank deposits of withholding, payroll, social
security and other taxes as by law required of Plaintiff. . . .
(R. at 3, 5,fflflO,22.) Both also "expressly and implicitly covenanted and agreed that [they]
would charge and commission the performance of... services and duties by such of [their]
employees as would perform the same accurately, properly, competently and with honesty
and fidelity." (R. at 3,5, f 11, 23.)
Tebbs and Rex argued that since there was no written contract and no evidence that
Tebbs and Rex ever made an "express representation of the 'covenant' of fidelity alleged in
the Complaint," (R. at 196), the covenant to act with honesty and fidelity was an implied
duty "independently imposed by law," (R. at 196). They argued that because such was an
independently imposed duty it was not a contractual duty, but a tort duty. Consequently, they
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continue, Guardian's action is in reality a negligence claim. Despite the earnestness of the
arguments, they are based on a misapprehension of both Guardian's position and the law.
A.

Contractual Causes of Action vs. Tort Causes of Action

This Court has engaged in lengthy discussion regarding the differences between
contractual and tort claims. Citing the California Supreme Court, this Court has explained
that
[A] wrongful act committed in the course of a contractual relationship may
afford both tort and contractual relief.... [IJfthe cause of action arises from
a breach of a promise set forth in the contract, the action is ex contractu, but
if it arises from a breach of duty growing out of the contract it is ex delicto.
DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1983) (quoting Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980)). In other words, if a wrongdoer's obligation "to
refrain from" doing a particular act "depend[s] upon any express or implied promise arising
from the ... contract*" a breach of that obligation gives rise to a cause of action in contract.
Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280,1284 (Utah 1992) (emphasis added). If, however, the
wrongdoer's obligation to refrain from doing a particular act arises from "'a legal duty
independently imposed as a result of what the [wrongdoer] undertook to do with relation to
the plaintiffs interest,'" a breach of that obligation gives rise to a cause of action in tort.
DCR, 663 P.2d at 437 (quoting Carl S. Hawkins, Retaining Traditional Tort Liability in the
Nonmedical Professions, 1981 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 33, 36). "Thus, when a defendant has
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undertaken to give professional services gratuitously, liability may be imposed for injuries
resulting from substandard conduct, even though there is no contract." Id.
Accordingly, when a party has contracted with a professional for the performance of
some duty, the professional making a mistake may be liable under several different theories.
As discussed above, in Utah, the courts have recognized that such wrongdoing may give rise
to the following causes of action: (1) breach of contract, (2) negligence, and (3) breach of
fiduciary duty. See Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1289; see also Pasquin v. Pasquin, 1999 UT App.
245, f 15 n.5, 988 P.2d 1 (recognizing three separate causes of action for legal malpractice),
cert denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 2000); Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman,
584 P.2d 894, 904 (Utah 1978) (Maughan, J., dissenting) (stating "an action for legal
malpractice may be framed conceptually as either a tort or a breach of contract"). If a
plaintiff alleges that there was a contract with a professional, there was a material breach of
an express or implied term of that contract, and damages were caused by that breach, the
person has alleged a breach of contract. See Goldwasser & Arnold, supra note 2, § 3.2;
Mallen & Smith, supra note 2, § 8.5; Anderson & Steele, supra note 2, at 245-246. If, on the
other hand, a plaintiff alleges that the law independently imposed a duty on a defendant a
result of the defendant's relationship with the plaintiff, and the defendant breached that duty
causing damages to the defendant, the plaintiff has alleged a negligence cause of action. See
DCR, 663 P.2d at 437.
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Given the state of the law, the arguments raised by Tebbs' and Rex's below, that other
jurisdictions "require a claim for breach of an accountant's professional standards to be
brought as a negligence or professional malpractice action," are misplaced. (See R. at 198.)
Utah law clearly recognizes the ability of victims of a professional's bad judgments to sue,
not only in tort, but also in contract. In this case, Guardian has alleged that (1) when Tebbs
and Rex failed to pay only Guardian's employees, they failed to fulfill the terms of their
respective contracts with Guardian, and (2) when Tebbs and Rex failed to disclose that they
had written and paid unauthorized checks, they failed to fulfill the terms of their respective
contracts with Guardian. Guardian does not allege that Tebbs' and Rex's respective levels
of practice fell below a standard of care because they gave Guardian bad accounting advise
or they failed to supervise their employees or they failed to follow certain accounting
standards. Guardian alleges only that it had a contract with both Tebbs and Rex to perform
certain acts, and Tebbs and Rex did not perform those acts or did not perform those acts in
good faith. See, e.g., Clark v. Milam, 847 F. Supp. 409, 420-21 (S.D. W. Va. 1994). Such
a claim is a breach of contract claim. See Goldwasser & Arnold, supra note 2, § 3.2, at 3-11,
3-13 ("Accountants may be held liable for breach of contract where they fail to perform a
specific service which they are committed by contract to perform;" and "an accountant may
be held liable for failing to perform contractual obligations in a satisfactory manner."); cf.
Mallen & Smith, supra note 2, § 8.8 ("The client may instruct the attorney to perform certain
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tasks or to act in a specified manner. The undertaking then becomes contractual in nature,
and the failure to perform can result in virtual strict liability for any resulting injury.")
B.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

As described above, Guardian has alleged that Tebbs and Rex entered into agreements
with Guardian to provide and perform professional public accounting services, including
preparation of checks made payable to Guardian's employees and drawn on Guardian's bank
checking account (Payroll Account) and the performance of account statement reconciliation
services with regard to the Payroll Account. As discussed above, these facts are undisputed
and admitted. (See R. at 3, 37, 182-83, 210.)
Because these contracts were performed in this state, Rex and Tebbs also assumed
certain unexpressed, constructive contractual duties. "In this state, a covenant of good faith
and fair dealing inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships

To comply with [t]his

obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's actions must be consistent with the
agreed common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." St. Benedicts Dev.
Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194,199-200 (Utah 1991); see also PDQ Lube Center\
Inc. v. Ruber, 949 P.2d 792, 798 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In other words, "the parties to a
contract are deemed to intend that the terms of a contract should be construed in a manner
which assumes the parties intended that the duties and rights created by the contract should
be performed...

in good faith"

Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991)

(emphasis added); PDQ, 949 P.2d at 798. The Utah Supreme Court has unambiguously held
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that a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing "'is read into contracts in order
to protect the express covenants or promises of the contract, not to protect some general
public policy interest not directly tied to the contract's purpose."' Peterson v. Browning, 832
P.2d 1280, 1284 (Utah 1992) (quoting Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 394
(Cal. 1988)); see also Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985).
Hence, this Court has expressly concluded that "a violation of th[e] duty [of good faith and
fair dealing] gives rise to a claim for breach of contract" Beck, 701 P.2d at 798 (emphasis
added); see also St. Benedicts, 811 P.2d at 200.
Therefore, according to Utah law, implied in Rex's and Tebbs' contracts with
Guardian were duties to perform their services in a way that complied with the agreed
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party. A breach of that duty gave
rise to a breach of contract.
Guardian has alleged such a breach. Guardian has alleged and it is undisputed that
Rex and Tebbs agreed that they would prepare checks to pay those persons on Guardian's
payroll. Guardian did not expect that they would write checks to individuals not on
Guardian's payroll nor did it expect that they would not disclose to Guardian that Rex and
Tebbs had so written and caused to be paid such unauthorized checks. Thus, Rex and Tebbs
did not act within the agreed common purpose of the contract or according to Guardian's
justified expectations, nor did Rex and Tebbs perform their duties under the contract in good
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faith. Accordingly, Guardian has alleged that Rex and Tebbs breached their contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when it failed to perform those duties.
Relying on Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991), the trial court further
concluded that an implied covenant could not be construed into Guardian's respective
contracts with Rex and Tebbs because to do so would be "to imply new independent rights
not agreed upon by the parties." (R. at 464, 34.) This determination is also incorrect.
Brehany involved an employee's attempt to claim that, because Utah imposed upon every
contract a duty of good faith, an at-will employment contract now required that an employer
"show that [a] discharge is made in good faith" before discharging an employee. Id. at 55.
Rejecting the argument, this Court noted:
Under the implied covenant of good faith applied in Resource Management,
the parties to a contract are deemed to intend that the terms of a contract
should be construed in a manner which assumes the parties intended that the
duties and rights created by the contract should be performed and exercised in
good faith. Such a covenant cannot be construed, however, to establish new,
independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties. Nor can a
covenant of good faith be used to nullify a right granted by a contract to one
of the parties or to require a party vested with a contract right to exercise that
right in a manner contrary to that party's legitimate self-interest.
Id. at 55. Thus, according to Brehany, if a party asserts the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in a way that would (1) create new rights or duties not agreed upon by the parties,
(2) nullify a right granted by a contract, or (3) require a party with a contractual right to
exercise it in a manner contrary to that party's interests, that assertion of the implied duty is
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improper. In Brehany, the plaintiff attempted to do just that—change an at-will employment
contract to a termination-for-cause contract.
In this case, Guardian has not attempted to create new independent rights. As
discussed above, the assertion of the covenant merely would hold Tebbs and Rex accountable
for their failure to perform the contract pursuant to its terms. The assertion of the covenant
does not give Guardian any new rights—Guardian already had the right to have only its
employees paid and its bank statements reconciled; and Tebbs and Rex already had the duty
to assure that only Guardian employees were paid and the bank statements reconciled
pursuant to the contract. The assertion of the covenant does not nullify any right that Tebbs
or Rex can assert—Tebbs and Rex never had authority to pay anyone besides Guardian
employees, to permit its employees to take Guardian's money, or to fail to reconcile
statements. Finally, the assertion of the covenant does not require Tebbs and Rex to exercise
any rights they have in a manner contrary to their interests.
The only way that the trial court's conclusion that independent rights were created
makes any sense is if the law imposes no duty upon contracting parties to deal with other
contracting parties with honesty and fidelity in fulfilling the terms of the contract. To so
hold, of course, would be to entirely undermine the constructive covenant of good faith and
fair dealing, which requires that "a party's actions must be consistent with the agreed
common purpose and the justified expectations of the other party." St Benedicts Dev. Co.,
811 P.2d at 199-200.
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The trial court's conclusions (1) that the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is a tort duty and/or (2) that Guardian attempted to use the covenant of good faith and
fair dealing to add new, independent terms to the contract are, therefore; incorrect.4
III.

T H E TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE TORT DOCTRINE THAT
AN EMPLOYER IS NOT LIABLE IN RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR FOR THE ILLEGAL ACT OF
AN EMPLOYEE IS AN ABSOLUTE DEFENSE TO A BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION
AGAINST THE EMPLOYER

In the trial court, Tebbs and Rex argued that they were also entitled to summary
judgment because, although they agreed "that principals are bound by the acts of their
agents," "illegal acts by an employee, for the sole benefit and purpose of the employee and
not the employer, are not within the actual or apparent scope of authority." (R. at 411.)
Accordingly, they continued, they could not "be liable for such illegal acts." (Id.) The trial
court agreed, stating that "[t]he principle that an employer is not liable for the illegal acts of
an employee done for the employee's sole benefit, applies to contract actions as well, unless
otherwise agreed." (R. at 464, 34.)
The trial court's conclusion was based upon an incorrect understanding of the law and
Guardian's arguments. Guardian's sole contention is that Tebbs and Rex breached the terms
of their contracts with Guardian when they failed to pay only Guardian employees and when
4

The resolution of this issue is subject to the same caveat discussed in footnote 3.
One could argue that the trial court's conclusions regarding the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing were not the basis of its order granting summary judgment. Just as
discussed in footnote 3, however, this Court's resolution of the question will have a huge
impact at the trial of this matter. Accordingly, Guardian believes that this issue is of critical
importance and should be addressed.
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they failed to reconcile bank statements. Thus, the question before the trial court was fairly
straightforward: Did Tebbs and Rex breach their contracts by failing to pay only Guardian
employees and failing to reconcile bank statement?
There is no dispute that Tebbs and Rex had contracts with Guardian. There is no
dispute that the terms of those contracts included Tebbs' and Rex's obligation to prepare
checks for Guardian for Guardian's distribution to Guardian employees, for accounting
services on the payroll accounts, and reconciliation services. There is no dispute that
Guardian sent a listing of employees to be paid out of the payroll account, and that Tebbs and
Rex were required to prepare checks for the employees on the list. There is no dispute that
Guardian paid for those services. Thus, Tebbs and Rex had contractual duties to Guardian
to perform those services. Tebbs and Rex also had a duty of good faith and fair dealing to
perform the contract in such a way that was consistent with the agreed common purpose and
Guardian's justified expectations.
In this case, there is no dispute that during the period of time Rex and Tebbs were
contractually obligated to Guardian, thirty-eight checks were written to Stacey Howell
without authorization by Guardian. Accordingly, during that time, although Rex and Tebbs
were contractually obligated to prepare checks only for Guardian to distribute to Guardian
employees, Rex and Tebbs permitted the preparation of thirty-eight checks without authority
to do so. They also failed to account for the writing of those checks written or to notify
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Guardian that those checks had been written. This was a clear breach of the terms of the
agreement and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This is Guardian's sole claim.
Rex and Tebbs, however, asserted that because the actions of the person who caused
its breach, its employee Mitchell, were outside of the scope of her employment, Rex and
Tebbs are not liable. In support of this position, they cited cases that state that an employer
is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the activities of its employees that
are not within the scope of the employee's employment. See Birkner v. Salt Lake County»,
771 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1989) (employer sued under theory of respondeat superior for its
employee's sexual assault of patient); Wells v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., Inc., 590 P.2d 1261,
1263-64 (Utah 1979) (employer sued under theory of respondeat superior for employee's
misappropriation of trust funds)5; Sweatman v. Linton, 241 P. 309, 310 (Utah 1925)
(employer sued under theory of respondeat superior for its employee's malicious
prosecution); Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995); Los Ranchitos v. Tierra
Grande, Inc., 861 P.2d 263 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993). Although the cases stand for the general
propositions asserted, they do not resolve the issue before this Court.
The doctrine of respondeat superior is a tort doctrine under which an employer can
be held 'Vicariously liable for the tortious acts of an employee." Clark v. Pangan, 2000 UT
37, V, 980 P.2d 268.
5

The Court in Wells, where the victim of misappropriation of trust funds sued the
employee under only a tort theory and employer under respondeat superior theory, ruled that
the employer would be liable if the facts as alleged were true. See Wells, 590 P.2d at 1264.
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The policy objectives given for implementing vicarious liability under this
theory "are to prevent the recurrence of tortious conduct, to give greater
assurance of compensation for the victim, and to ensure that the victim's losses
will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise that gave rise
to the injury." It is also generally believed that an employer is best able to
control the conduct of an employee.
Id. (quoting 27 Am. Jur. 2d Employment Relationship § 459 (1996)). Apparently because
these policies are not served as well, or are overridden by competing concerns, employers
are vicariously liable only for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope
of their employment. See id. W 8-19.
Guardian is not claiming that it should be reimbursed under tort doctrines of
respondeat superior. In other words, Guardian is not asking that Tebbs ar

T

Rex be held

liable in tort for Ms. Mitchell's tortious and criminal acts. It is asking only for damages for
the breach of the contracts Rex and Tebbs made with Guardian Title to prepare and reconcile
its payroll accounts and to prepare its payroll checks. Guardian simply claims that there were
contracts between Guardian and Rex and Tebbs and that those contracts were breached.
"Whether [the breach] was due to personal fault of the [accountants] themselves or to that
of employees working for them is not material.

As in other like situations, public

accountants are liable for the failure of their subordinates [to perform the contract]." Board
of County Comm'rs v. Baker, 102 P.2d 1006, 1011 (Kan. 1940).
The trial court's decision means that the following premise is true: if an employer
breaches a contract with a person because of its employee's illegal acts, the person damaged
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by the breach has no cause of action against the employer for the breach of contract. This
is obviously not the law. Even if that were the law, the mischief created by such a rule would
be enormous.
For instance, suppose that Attorney Carefree has entered into a retainer agreement to
represent Client Lamb in the sale of a large real estate development. A check for the contract
price is sent to Carefree while Lamb is out of town on a vacation. Carefree and Lamb have
agreed that Swindle will hold the proceeds of the sale in his firm's trust account until Lamb
returns to the country after his vacation. Carefree asks Mr. Swindle, an attorney at Mr.
Carefree's law firm with signatory authority on the trust account, to deposit the check for
him. After Swindle deposits the check, without Carefree's knowledge, he writes himself a
check for the entire amount in the trust account and flees to Switzerland. When Lamb returns
and asks for his money, Carefree says he does not have it and cannot give it to him. Under
the trial court's analysis, Lamb has no cause of action for breach of contract against Carefree.
Another example:

Suppose Kim goes to a fast food restaurant and orders a

hamburger. The cashier asks for two dollars. Kim gives him the two dollars and the cashier
proceeds to go to the back of the restaurant and out the back door with the money. Kim,
wondering where his hamburger is, asks the manager. The manager says that the cashier has
disappeared and that he must have taken the money. When Kim asks for his hamburger, the
manager refuses to give it to him. According to the trial court, Kim has no claim against the
restaurant for the hamburger or the two dollars.

118398.GU006.010

25

Finally, suppose Storage, Inc., owns warehouses and provides storage space for its
customers to store various items. As part of its services, it agrees to provide security to
safekeep the property. Handy contracts with Storage to store his tools in one of Storage's
warehouses in exchange for his payment of $2,000 per month. Handy pays his monthly
payment promptly. During the time Handy stores his tools with Storage, without Storage's
knowledge, one of its employees steals half of Handy's items.

Handy asks for

reimbursement for the items. Storage refuses to reimburse him. According to the trial court,
Handy has no claim against Storage for breach of contract.
These examples illustrate the folly of the trial court's decision. In each of these cases,
a person or corporation contracted to provide a particular good or service. In order to fulfill
the terms of the contract, the entity used an employee to perform the services or to deliver
the goods. The employee engaged in a tortious, criminal act, which resulted in the breach
of the contract the employer had entered into with an innocent third party. There is no
question that the contract had been breached in each of these instances, the only question is
whether, because the criminal act of an employee was the cause of the breach, the employer
is excused from performance of the contract. The trial court's answer is that such a breach
is excused and that the third party, who had nothing to do with the employment of the
employee, is entitled to neither damage for the foreseeable effects of such breach nor return
of the contract price.
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Although not directly addressing the issue in this case, Horrocks v. Westfalia
Systemat, 892 P.2d 14 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), shows that such outcomes are inconsistent with
contract and agency law. In Horrocks, Westfalia, a dairy equipment manufacturer, employed
Buchanan as its sales representative in Utah. Id. at 15. Buchanan, acting as Westfalia's
agent, entered into a contract with Horrocks to supply milking equipment for the payment
of $14,000. Id. at 14. Horrocks paid the $14,000 but received only a portion of the milking
equipment, although he signed an acknowledgment stating that he had received all of it. Id.
at 15. Horrocks signed the acknowledgment without reading it after Buchanan presented it
to him, requested he sign it, and told Horrocks that the equipment would be delivered at a
later date. Id. Buchanan sent the acknowledgment to Westfalia, who then delivered the
$14,000 to him. Id. After receiving the money, Buchanan left town, taking the equipment
and cash with him. Id. The question before the court of appeals was whether Westfalia
breached a contract it had entered with Horrocks. In answer, the court stated:
First, Buchanan represented to Horrocks that he was acting as Westfalia's
agent. Westfalia made a similar representation to Horrocks by ratifying
Buchanan's actions. Westfalia allowed Buchanan to travel in a car bearing the
Westfalia insignia. In addition, Westfalia supplied the documentation for the
milking equipment contract, including the Acknowledgment form. Moreover,
Westfalia accepted and cashed Horrock's down payment check. Perhaps most
importantly, Westfalia failed to give Horrocks notice of any limitations on
Buchanan's authority. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for Horrock
to believe Buchanan's statement that if he signed the Acknowledgment, the
remainder of the equipment would be forthcoming. The loss that results from
Buchanan's misconduct must be borne by the party who empowered Buchanan
to commit the wrong [i.e., the principal]. "Where a loss is to be suffered
through the misconduct of an agent, it should be borne by those who put it in
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his power to do the wrong." Westfalia placed Buchanan in the position to
perpetrate a fraud. Consequently, Westfalia must bear the responsibility for
Buchanan's misconduct. The trial court did not err by placing liability on
Westfalia under the theory of apparent authority.
Id. at 16 (quotations omitted).
This case is analogous. Although in this case there is no question that Rex and Tebbs
had contracts with Guardian (the question of an agent's authority to bind a party, therefore,
not being at issue), the principle enunciated in Horrocks still applies—Where a loss is to be
suffered through the misconduct of an agent, it should be bome by those who empowered her
to do the wrong. In this case, there is no question that Guardian suffered a loss through the
misconduct of Tebbs' and Rex's agent. Tebbs aad Rex employed Ms. Mitchell to perform
the work they had contracted with Guardian to perform. Because Tebbs and Rex placed Ms.
Mitchell in the position to perpetrate the misconduct, Tebbs and Rex must bear the
responsibility for Ms. Mitchell's misconduct.
Further, when the trial court's decision is analyzed next to other principles of law,
there can be no question that the trial court erred. It is axiomatic, for instance, that "a party
who delegates his duties under a contract to a third person is not relieved of his
responsibilities, but rather remains ultimately responsible to the party with whom he
contracted for guaranteeing the successful execution of the contractual duties." First
American Commerce Co. v. Washington Mutual Sav. Bank, 743 P.2d 1193, 1194 (Utah
1987). Accordingly, assuming that Mitchell were not Rex's and Tebbs' employee but instead
were an independent contractor, if Tebbs and Rex had assigned their duties under their
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contracts with Guardian to Mitchell and she then breached, they would be liable to Guardian
for her breach of that contract. For the trial court's conclusion to make sense, the law of
delegation would have to be that if a delegee's breach was precipitated by the delegee's
intentional criminal act the delegor is excused from his or her ultimate responsibility. No
case of which Guardian is aware has ever taken this position. In the hypothetical scenario
imagined above, Tebbs and Rex would be liable to Guardian regardless of the reason for
Mitchell's breach. There is no reason to distinguish the employee scenario from that of the
independent contractor.
The trial court's conclusion that Tebbs and Rex were not liable for breach of contract
because the act constituting the breach was an illegal act committed by its employee was
incorrect. Accordingly, the trial court's conclusion that Tebbs and Rex were entitled to
judgment was also incorrect.
CONCLUSION
The trial court incorrectly concluded that Utah law requires any action brought against
a professional accounting firm must be treated in all respects as a negligence cause of action.
The trial court also incorrectly concluded that an action for the breach of an implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is one sounding in tort. Moreover, the trial court incorrectly
concluded that Guardian attempted to use the covenant of good faith and fair dealing to add
new, independent terms to the contract. Finally, the trial court incorrectly concluded that
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Tebbs and Rex were not liable in breach of contract for breaches of contract caused by an
illegal act committed by an employee.
Accordingly, Guardian respectfully requests this Court to reverse the order granting
summary judgment to Tebbs and Rex and remand the case for trial.
DATED this

of June, 2001.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Gary A. Weston
D. Scott Crook
Attorneys for Plaintiff, Guardian Title
Company of Utah
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ADDENDUM
A.
B.
C.
D.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STIPULATED JUDGMENT
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
TRANSCRIPT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT HEARING

Tab A

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Stephen K. Christiansen (6512)
Attorneys for Defendant Stagg & Associates
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
ny .
P.O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 532-3333

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF
UTAH, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER
vs.
STACEY MITCHELL, formerly known as
STACEY HOWELL, an individual;
TEBBS & SMITH P.C, a Utah
corporation; DOUGLAS L. REX, an
individual; and STAGG & ASSOCIATES,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 990904087
Honorable Anne M. Stirba

Defendants.

This case came on for hearing on October 25, 2000, at 8:30 a.m. on all pending
motions. The Honorable Anne M. Stirba presided. Gary A. Weston and D. Scott Crook
appeared on behalf of Guardian Title Company of Utah. Douglas T. Hall appeared on behalf
of Tebbs & Smith, P.C. ("Tebbs & Smith"). Michael F. Jones appeared on behalf of Douglas
L. Rex. Stephen K. Christiansen appeared on behalf of Stagg & Associates. Stacey Mitchell
did not appear.

M70T

The Court heard oral argument from counsel on the pending motions, issued bench
rulings on those motions, and directed counsel for Stagg & Associates to prepare and circulate
a proposed form of order.
Having reviewed the pleadings and all relevant law, having considered the argument
of counsel, being fully informed in the matter, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby
enters the following Order:
1.

Stagg & Associates' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED for

the reasons advanced by Stagg & Associates. Stagg & Associates' Motion in Limine is
therefore rendered MOOT.
2.

Plaintiffs motions to strike the Joinders of Tebbs & Smith and Douglas L. Rex

in Stagg & Associates' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment are DENIED. The Court
grants summary judgment to Tebbs & Smith, and Douglas L. Rex as requested by each of
them on the same grounds and for the same reasons articulated in connection with Stagg &
Associates' motion.
3.

Douglas L. Rex's Motion for Summary Judgment on Tebbs & Smith's cross-

claim is GRANTED. Tebbs & Smith's "Objection" is not a proper response to a summary
judgment motion and is overruled in any event because Tebbs & Smith's indemnity crossclaim is precluded by the Utah Liability Reform Act as interpreted by governing case law.
DATED this \b

day of I Kh * > C f r \ 0 ( r e v ^;2000.
BY THE COURT:

ByNiM^-^-gANNEM. STIRBA
Third Judicial District Court Judge
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF
UTAH, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
VS.

]
]
1 STIPULATED JUDGMENT AGAINST
;) DEFENDANT STACEY MITCHELL
,

STACEY MITCHELL, formerly known as
STACEY HOWELL; TEBBS & SMITH
P.C., a corporation; DOUGLAS L. REX;
STAGG & ASSOCIATES, a corporation,

;)
;
;)
;

Defendants.

]

Civil No. 990904087
Judge Anne M. Stirba

Based on that certain Stipulation Directed at Plaintiffs Claims Against Stacey Mitchell
and Stagg & Associates dated March 12, 2001, and the agreement therein made by Plaintiff and
Defendant, Stacey Mitchell, for entry of a stipulated judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
said Defendant, and good cause appearing therefor,

115481 GL006 010

MH^

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Guardian Title
Company of Utah, have and recover from Defendant, Stacey Mitchell, the amount of $23,000,
with interest thereon from date hereof at the rate provided in Section 15-1-4(3), UTAH CODE
ANN.

DATED this

/

p day of March, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

fr.€&2l

-7

_7Z

<r\ - A _ z — N ^ ^ ^ ^ i L ^

HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRB^ \,, y&jj
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
• f^^K

: £>
S J/

Approved as to Form:
FABIAN & CLEND
By:. ' ^ A ^
Todd C. Emerson, Attorney for Defendant,
Stacey Mitchell
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M'SO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this (If

day of March, 2001,1 did cause a true and

correct copy of the foregoing STIPULATED JUDGMENT to be mailed, United States mails,
postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Douglas T. Hall, Esq.
4885 South 900 East, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793
Attorney for Tebbs & Smith
Stephen K. Christiansen, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340
Attorneys for Stagg & Associates
Michael F. Jones, Esq.
Baird & Jones
One Utah Center, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Douglas L. Rex
Todd C. Emerson, Esq.
Fabian & Clendenin
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210
Attorneys for Stacey Mitchell
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Gary A. Weston (#3435)
D. Scott Crook (#7495)
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)532-1900
Facsimile: (801)532-1913

/

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY OF
UTAH, a corporation,

;
]) ORDER OF DISMISSAL
) WITH PREJUDICE OF:
Plaintiff,
;) (1) PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT
)
AGAINST STAGG;
•
(2)
DEFENDANT
STAGG'S
vs.
]
)
CROSSCLAIM AGAINST
STACEY MITCHELL, formerly known as ;)
DEFENDANT MITCHELL
STACEY HOWELL; TEBBS & SMITH
;
P.C., a corporation; DOUGLAS L. REX; ;
STAGG & ASSOCIATES, a corporation, ;) Civil No. 990904087
Defendants.

])

Judge Anne M. Stirba

Upon the stipulation of Plaintiff, Guardian Title Company of Utah, and Defendants,
Stacey Mitchell and Stagg & Associates, dated March 12, 2001, and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs Complaint and the claims therein made
against Defendant, Stagg & Associates, should be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice, and

115486.GU006.010

the crossclaim of Stagg & Associates against Stacey Mitchell and the claims therein made should
be and hereby is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this - ^

day of March, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

1
y

/

^L

a
^

^

•

HONORABLE ANNE M7STIRBA
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
Approved as to Form:
NIELSEN & SENIOR

Gar^A. Weston, ^Attorney for Plaintiff,
^Xiuardian^itle Company of Utah
FABIAN & CLENDENIN

Todd C. Emerson, Attorney for Defendant,
Stacey Mitchell
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY

Stephen K. Christiansen, Attorney for Defendant,
Stagg & Associates
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /£/"day of March, 2001,1 did cause a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE to be mailed,
United States mails, postage prepaid, addressed to the following:
Douglas T. Hall, Esq.
4885 South 900 East, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117-5793
Attorney for Tebbs & Smith
Stephen K. Christiansen, Esq.
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0340
Attorneys for Stagg & Associates
Michael F. Jones, Esq.
Baird & Jones
One Utah Center, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Douglas L. Rex
Todd C. Emerson, Esq.
Fabian & Clendenin
P.O. Box 510210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210
Attorneys for Stacey Mitchell
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE CITY
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

2

-oOo-

3
4

GUARDIAN TITLE COMPANY
OF UTAH,
Case No. 990904087

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Plaintiff,
MOTION
vs.
(Videotape Proceedings1
STACEY MITCHELL/STACEY
HOWELL, TEBBS & SMITH, P.C.,
DOUGLAS L. REX and STAGG &
ASSOCIATES,

FILED DISTRICT COUif
Th:-n indicia! District

NOV 2 8 2000

Defendants.

SALT LAKE
e^Hty^jam

BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 25th day of
October, 2000, commencing at the hour of 8:38 a.m., the
above-entitled matter came on for hearing before the
HONORABLE ANNE M. STIRBA, sitting as Judge in the above-

15

named Court for the purpose of this cause and that the

16

following videotape proceedings were had.

17
18

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiff:

19
20
21
22

GARY A. WESTON
D. SCOTT CROOK
Attorneys at Law
Nielsen & Senior
Suite 1100, Eagle Gate Plaza
& Office Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84111
1019

23
24
25

ALAN P. SMITH, CSR

ORIGINAL

385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

considered those, the various cases that seem pivotal and
the arguments on counsel and I'm prepared to rule on these
issues this morning.
First of all, with their motion, with his motion,
Rex argues that Tebbs may not maintain an indemnity action
against him because it's prohibited by Utah Code Annotated,
Section 78-27-37 through 38—through 78-27-43 and because
of the National Services Industries, Inc. case.
Specifically, what Rex is—is arguing, is that
the Utah Liability Reform Act has abolished claims for
indemnity.
Now, Tebbs has opposed the motion on the ground
that the act would only preclude a separate action brought
by Tebbs against Rex, after an earlier case found some
liability on the part of Tebbs.
Is that a fair summary of your argument?
MR. HALL:

Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

I would note at first,

Tebbs argued in writing, in a document entitled "Objection"
as opposed to a "Memorandum in Opposition" to a motion—to
a motion for summary judgment and of course, there is a—a
concern expressed.

First, that the objection that was

filed does not contain a statement of uncontested or
statement of undisputed facts or disputed facts as required
by 4-501 and should not even be considered by the Court.
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And that is a valid contention against the—the document
actually filed.
And for that reason, the objection should be
overruled.

Under the circumstances, I did look also to the

merits of the claim, however, and for that reason, and
based on—on the law before the Court and the undisputed
facts, the motion for summary judgment should be granted.
The—the cross-claim contains only one cause of
action, a claim for indemnity and despite the con—the
claims to the contrary, this indemnity action is clearly
precluded by Utah—by the Utah Liability Reform Act as set
forth in the National Securities Industries. Inc. case.
Accordingly, in that—for that reason, summary judgment is
appropriate.
With regard to Stagg's motion for summary
judgment or alternatively, the motion in limine, certainly
Kilpatrick stands for the proposition that implicit in any
professional agreement to perform services, such as
accounting services, is the duty to deal honestly with
funds entrusted by a client and although this is a con—a
contractual action, the court in Kilpatrick made clear that
the analysis is the same with this duty as it would be in a
negligence action. And for example, causation or proximate
cause, for that matter, must be shown.
And as to the implied covenant of good faith, it-
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-it appears that this does not help the plaintiff, as the
covenant cannot be construed to imply new independent
rights not agreed upon by the parties and I'm looking to
the Nordstrom case for support for that position.
And—but with regard to this agency issue,
Guardian has not suggested that Mitchell's acts were
undertaken for any benefit but her own.

Clearly, on the

undisputed facts before the Court at this point, that
Mitchell's acts—and they appear to have been conceded for
this argument anyway—that she wrote this—wrote these
checks to herself, that she did these solely for her
benefit and not for the benefit of her employer.
The principle that an employer is not liable for
the illegal acts of an employee done for the employee's
sole benefit, applies to contract actions as well, unless
otherwise agreed.
It appears that these—and—and—nor has Guardian
contended that Mitchell's acts were done within the scope
of her duties for the—for her employer.
Accordingly, for these reasons and the other
reasons argued, the motion for partial summary judgment is
granted.
This makes the motion in limine moot.
I would also indicate for the record, the
plaintiff has moved to strike both the joinder of—and also
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Tebbs' motion, arguing that they were filed after the
scheduling order cut-off.

The scheduling order says what

it says, there was no request for consideration of the—
these motions beyond time and—and so they were filed
untimely.
Let's see, I believe I've covered everything.
Are there any questions about my rulings or the
reasons for them?
MR. HALL: With—yeah.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. HALL:

Your Honor, with regard—oh—

THE COURT: What?
MR. HALL: Well—
THE COURT: Mr. Hall?
MR. HALL:

—your—your Honor, you—you granted

the motions to strike then; is that what I understand?
THE COURT:

Correct. Correct.

MR. HALL: All right. So that leaves Rex and
Tebbs in the case—
THE COURT: Oh, I see.
MR. HALL:
THE COURT:

—but not—
I see, yes.

MR. HALL: —Staggs.
THE COURT: Well, all right. However—well, I—I
see your point.
35

I actually—technically, that is the—the—the—
you know, when I consider the argument about failing to
file timely; however, in this case, because although the
plaintiff did not respond to the facts of each defendant
individually, the same principles would be addressed
regardless.

And so for that reason, I—I'm going to

reverse myself.

I see the problem.

As to Tebbs' motion for partial summary judgment,
I'm going to deny the motion to strike—excuse me, I'm
going to deny the motion to strike because the plaintiff,
although the plaintiff did not respond to the facts of each
defendant individually, the same principles would be
addressed and—and resolved the same way.

So, I—I reverse

myself on that.
So, I'm denying the motion to strike, granting
the cross-claim defendant's motion for summary judgment and
granting Stagg's motion for—for summary judgment. The
motion in limine is moot.
Yes?

I think that clears it up.

Mr. Jones?

MR. JONES:

Your Honor, I'm—I'm still unclear.

My client has joined in Stagg's motion and—and has made—
and we have made the same motion on behalf of Mr. Rex as
Stagg has, by way of our joinder. And then in turn, Mr.
Hall has made the same motion on behalf of Tebbs & Smith.
So, my question is whether the Court is granting
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our motions as well?
THE COURT:

I am.

I am.

For the reasons I

indicated and I—I apologize for the ambiguity.Mr. Weston?
MR. WESTON:

Your Honor, so that the plaintiff

might understand now, is the Court's ruling then that we go
to trial in this case against the defendants on a tort
claim or is the ruling that we don't go to trial against
them at all?
THE COURT: Well, I had--I don't think there's a
tort claim pleaded.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Your Honor, as I understand

it, we excluded one part of the existing claim from our
motion.

I believe that's still on the table and that is

with respect t o —
THE COURT: To the payroll tax reports?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Correct. Other than that, I

understand that—
THE COURT:

And—

MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

—the remaining issues have

been ruled on as a matter of law and dismissed.
THE COURT: All right.

So, what has not been

decided is—is—are claims involving the preparation of the
payroll tax reports, the deposits of payroll, Social
Security and other taxes.

Is there any other aspect of
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this that I'm missing?
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

I don't believe so.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

So—

Those your Honor directed only

as to the defendant, Stagg & Associates, not at the other
two defendants.
THE COURT: Right.

That's why, although you are

technically correct that they were filed—their responses
were filed beyond the—the scheduling order cut-off and
ordinarily, I'd—I'd go with that; but in this case, given-given the other rulings, I'm going to permit consideration
of the late filings and deny your motions to strike or to
oppose the joinder in the motion, and thus, they are
removed from the case.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

So then is our understanding

that the Court has therefore dismissed all of the
plaintiff's claims with the exception of the claim against
Stagg & Associates having to do with the payroll accounts
reconciliation, the deposit and the tax deposits?
(Inaudible)
THE COURT:
MR. WESTON:

I believe that's—
I don't think the payroll account,

that's not accurate. No, the payroll taxes, there's a —
there's a separate issue with respect t o —
MR. HALL: Against all—
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MR. WESTON:

—the proper payment of payroll

taxes, that's all (inaudible) the statutes.
THE COURT: Do you agree with that, Mr. Weston—
(Inaudible)
THE COURT:

—based on my ruling?

MR. WESTON:

Yes. Yeah. Yeah.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. WESTON:

So, the Court has ruled therefore

that the defendants are dismissed out of the case, Tebbs &
Smith and—and Doug Rex are dismissed out, Stagg is out
except with regard to the payroll tax deposit issue?
THE COURT: That is correct.
MR. WESTON: Okay.
THE COURT: That is correct. All right.
Mr. Christiansen, I'm going to have you prepare
an order consistent with these rulings.
I'm sorry about my con—confusing the issues at
the end but I think we're clear now and the—the impact of
these rulings and are there any other questions?
I thank you gentlemen very much. Those are the
rulings today.
Mr. Christiansen, I look forward to your proposed
order, after you've submitted it to Counsel.
MR. CHRISTIANSEN:

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Court's in recess.
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TRANSCRIBERS CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss,

I, Toni Frye, do hereby certify:
That I am a transcriber for Alan P. Smith,
Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Certified Court
Transcriber of Tape Recorded Court Proceedings; that I
received an electronically recorded videotape of the within
matter and under his supervision have transcribed the same
into typewriting, and the foregoing pages, numbered from 1
to 39, inclusive, to the best of my ability constitute a
full, true and correct transcription, except where it is
indicated the Videotape Recorded Court Proceedings were
inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 18th day of
November, 2000.

Transcriber
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 18th day
of November, 2000.
NOTARY PUBLIC
ALAN P. SMITH
385 BRAHMA DRIVE
MURRAY, UT 84107
COMMISSION EXPIRES
DEC. 4,2001
STATE OF UTAH
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I, Alan P. Smith, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
Notary Public and a Certified Court Transcriber of Tape
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transcribed into typewriting, and that the foregoing pages,
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knowledge, constitute a full, true and correct
transcription, except where it is indicated the Videotape
Recorded Court Proceedings were inaudible.
I do further certify that I am not counsel,
attorney or relative of either party, or clerk or
stenographer of either party or of the attorney of either
party, or otherwise interested in the event of this suit.
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of
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NOTARY PUBLIC
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